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Abstract
We introduce the new concept of prudent equilibrium to model strategic uncertainty, and prove
it exists in large classes of discontinuous games. When the game is better-reply secure, we show that
prudent equilibrium refines Nash equilibrium. In contrast with the current literature, we don’t use
probabilities to model players’ strategies and beliefs about other players’ strategies. We provide ex-
amples (first-price auctions, location game, Nash demand game, etc.) where the prudent equilibrium
is the intuitive solution of the game.
JEL classification: C02, C62, C72, L13.
Keywords: prudent equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, refinement, strategic uncertainty, better-reply
secure.
1 Introduction
Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with complete information between two bidders. The players
are characterized by their valuation v1 and v2 of the item for sale, v1 < v2, and they are supposed to
choose bids x1 and x2 in [0,M ], M > 0. Assume that in case of ties, i.e. if x1 = x2, then the winner is
the player with the highest value. An easy computation proves that for every x ∈ [v1, v2], the strategy
profile (x, x) is a Nash equilibrium of this strategic game. Yet, for x > v1, these equilibria represent
fragile situations, because of strategic uncertainty: if player 2 does not respect his equilibrium strategy
and decreases slightly his bid, then player 1 gets the item for a price x higher than his valuation v1. As
a matter of fact, any strategy x1 ≤ v1 is also a best-reply of player 1 if player 2 plays x > v1, but x1 is
immune to a small modification of player 2’s strategy. In addition, if player 2 is supposed to play x > v1,
and if he predicts that his opponent should play x1 ≤ v1, then he could be tempted to lower his bid x in
order to increase his payoff. Thus, playing x > v1 for player 1 seems definitely a bad choice, even if the
other player is assumed to play the same strategy.
This example illustrates that Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to keep some
predictive power. Note that the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in such game can be obtained from
∗Paris School of Economics, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne UMR 8174, Universite´ Paris I Panthe´on/ Sorbonne,
106/112 Boulevard de l’Hoˆpital 75647 Paris Cedex 13. E-mail: bich@univ-paris1.fr
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Reny’s theorem [23], which guarantees existence for the large class of better-reply secure games. This
class encompasses many discontinuous economic games, in particular the first-price auction described
above. Astonishingly, there is no refinement notion of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for discontinuous
games which covers this example, or more generally the class of better-reply secure games. A possible
reason is that most refinement notions - like perfect equilibrium of Selten [27] - require the existence of
equilibria of some auxiliary games, where the players’ strategies are perturbed by random mistakes, and
payoffs are expected payoffs. If the initial game is better-reply secure but discontinuous, such auxiliary
games are in general neither better-reply secure nor quasiconcave, thus general existence result in pure
strategies cannot be used.1
In this paper, we introduce a new refinement of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games,
called prudent equilibrium. We prove its existence (Theorem 15) for the class of p-robust games, which
contains many discontinuous economic games. Roughly, a game is p-robust if for every joint strategy x,
no player can increase largely his payoff at x by arbitrary small modifications of his strategy, even if the
other players can change slightly their strategy. The first-price auction above is p-robust: for example, at
every strategy profile (x, x) with x < v1, if player 1 increases his strategy a little bit, player 2 can answer
by the same modification, so that player 1 does not increase his payoff.
We now provide an informal definition of our main solution concept, prudent equilibrium. The main
issue in the introductory example is strategic uncertainty, i.e. the uncertainty related to other players’
strategies and rationality (see Brandenburger [5]). A radical way to remove strategic uncertainty in games
would be to consider extremely prudent players, who try to maximize u˜i(x) = infx−i∈X−i ui(xi, x−i) with
respect to their strategy xi, ui being the initial payoff function of player i, and X−i the strategy sets of
his opponents. A less extreme answer would be to assume that given player i’s belief about the potential
strategy profile x−i of his opponents, he has good reasons to think that their true strategies will stay in
some set Y−i(x−i) ⊂ X−i. Then, a prudent player would choose his strategy xi in order to maximize
u˜i(x) = infy−i∈Y−i(x−i) ui(xi, y−i) . This function can also be written as
u˜i(x) = inf
y−i∈X−i
(ui(xi, y−i) + δ(y−i, x−i))
where
δ(x−i, y−i) =
{
0 if y−i ∈ Y−i(x−i),
+∞ otherwise.
In the infimum above, note that only the strategies y−i for which δ(y−i, x−i) is equal to 0 are useful,
and the other one, for which δ(y−i, x−i) is infinite, can be removed. In short, δ is a measure for player i
of the importance of a potential deviation y−i from the the expected strategy profile x−i.
A natural generalization leads to the definition of the following auxiliary ”prudent” game
uλi (x) = inf
y−i∈X−i
(ui(xi, y−i) +
ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
) (1)
where ci : X−i × X−i → R, and λ > 0 is some normalization coefficient. The function ci(x−i,y−i)λ
could be interpreted as a (free) insurance payed to player i if the other players −i play y−i instead
1Carbonnel ([7], [6]) extends the existence of perfect equilibria in mixed strategies for some particular classes of discon-
tinuous games. Andersson et al. [2] have recently introduced a pure strategy refinement of Nash equilibrium which has
cutting power in some discontinuous games, but whose existence is guaranteed only in continuous games.
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of the expected strategy x−i, and 1/λ would parametrize the insurance level. By analogy with the
previous case, the function ci(y−i,x−i)λ is also a way to parametrize strategic uncertainty: x−i ∈ X−i is
the strategy expected by player i, and ci(y−i,x−i)λ ≤
ci(y
′
−i,x−i)
λ means that the possible deviation y−i has
more importance for player i than y′−i has.
Interestingly, the prudent behaviour described above has a smoothing effect on the initial game: in
general, the prudent payoff functions u˜i are more regular than the initial payoff functions ui. This
smoothing effect implies that for every p-robust game G, and for a large class of functions ci, there exists
a Nash equilibrium of the prudent game associated to G (Theorem 11). This opens a route for refinement,
and indeed, we prove that if the initial game G is better-reply secure, and if the level of insurance 1/λ
tends to +∞, then any limit point of Nash equilibria of the prudent games is a Nash equilibrium of
G (Proposition 14). We call this limit a prudent equilibrium, and we prove it is a refinement of Nash
equilibrium. For example, in the first-price auction above, the only prudent equilibrium is the intuitive
solution (v1, v1).
Our definition of a prudent game should be compared to variational preferences, introduced by Mac-
cheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [17] to model uncertainty aversion in decision theory. Recall that
variational preferences on the set of acts F are represented by
V (f) = min
p∈∆
(
∫
u(f)dp+ c(p)),
where u is a utility function, f ∈ F an act, ∆ the set of priors over a state space S, and c : ∆→ [0,+∞]
an index of uncertainty aversion. The interpretation by Maccheroni et al. is the following. When the
decision maker contemplates choosing an act f , the malevolent Nature tries to minimize its expected
utility. Any prior p can be chosen, but Nature must pay a cost c(p) to do so. In their setting, this cost
is also interpreted as an ambiguity index.
Our model adapts2 some of these ideas to a strategic setting. In particular, ambiguity is turned into
strategic uncertainty. But a major difference is that variational preferences are valid in a probabilistic
setting, although we consider only a deterministic framework. Also, the cost ci(x−i, y−i) in our model
depends on potential strategy profile y−i of −i, which plays the role of p in variational preferences, but
also on the strategy profile x−i expected by i.
Many other papers have tried to model strategic uncertainty in games. In quantal-response equilib-
rium models, pioneered by Kelvey and Palfrey [19], strategic uncertainty is represented by a probability
distribution (some noise) added to the initial payoff of each player, which defines a perturbed game.
For every mixed strategy profile σ, every player i acts optimally in the perturbed game against σ−i.
This induces another probability distribution over the observed actions of the players. If this probability
distribution is σ, it is, by definition, a quantal-response equilibrium. In a similar vein, Andersson et
al. [2] consider that players choose pure strategies, and strategic uncertainty is now represented through
probabilistic subjective beliefs about the strategies of each player’s opponents. As above, this defines an
equilibrium notion in some auxiliary noisy game. Remark that both approaches are related to refinement
literature (see Selten [27] or Myerson [21]), and as a matter of fact, when the level of noise tends to zero,
they provide refinement concepts.
2De marco and Romaniello [10] have adapted Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [17] to a Bayesian strategic setting.
Their model and their scope is not connected with ours.
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Non additive models are an alternative to model strategic uncertainty. If strategic uncertainty is
represented by a set of priors, then the preferences of each players can be defined through Choquet
expected utility model (see Mukerji [20], Marinacci [18] , Ryan [26], or Eichberger and Kelsey [12] who
also model optimism or pessimism in strategic games), or through Gilboa-Schmeidler maximin model
(Klibanov [14], Dow-Verlang [11], Lo [16] or De Marco and Romaniello [10]). Most papers above differ
in their definition of the support for the beliefs. Recently, Renou and Schlag [22] have proposed a dual
model based on minimax behaviour: in their approach, regret guides players in forming probabilistic
assessments and, ultimately, in making choices.
The main difference between our model and these models is that beliefs about the strategies of the
other players are not represented by sets of priors, but by deterministic functions. It turns out to be a
very tractable approach in many cases, even when the initial game is discontinuous (see Section 5), and it
has several interpretations. For readers who are more interested in mixed strategies, note that our model
can also be applied to the mixed extension of a game. We give only one example to illustrate this point
(Example 35), and more generally, prudent equilibria in mixed strategies will be studied in a separate
paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces p-robustness and prudent games. A measure
of strategic uncertainty is defined, together with some local comparison index of strategic uncertainty
between players. In addition, we characterize the class of prudent payoffs. Section 3 introduces prudent
equilibrium, and proves it is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in better-reply secure games. Section 4
proposes some extensions, for example when the game possesses enough symmetry. Section 5 provides
examples. Mathematical proofs are given in the last section.
2 The main solution concepts
2.1 The general framework
There are N players.3 The pure strategy set of each player i ∈ N , denoted by Xi, is a non-empty,
compact subset of a metric topological vector space (Ei, di). Each player i has a bounded payoff function
ui : X =
∏
i∈N
Xi → R.
A strategic game G is a pair G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ). For every x ∈ X and every i ∈ N , we denote
x−i = (xj)j 6=i and X−i = Πj 6=iXj . Throughout this paper, a game G satisfying the above assumptions is
called a compact game. Additionally, G is called a quasiconcave game if for every player i, Xi is convex,
and if for every player i and every strategy x−i ∈ X−i, ui(xi, x−i) is quasiconcave in xi. The game G is
called continuous if for every player i, ui is continuous in x.
We shall denote by Γ = {(x, u(x)) : x ∈ X} the closure of the graph of G. Let us define the “se-
cure payoff level” of player i when he plays di and when the other players play x−i by ui(di, x−i) =
lim infx′−i→x−i ui(di, x
′
−i). Following Reny [23], the game G is better-reply secure if whenever (x, v) ∈ Γ
and x is not a Nash equilibrium, some player i ∈ N can secure a payoff strictly above vi, i.e. there exists
di ∈ Xi such that ui(di, x−i) > vi. It is easy to check that every continuous game is better-reply secure,
3According to the context, N will denote the set of players or its cardinal.
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and we recall that every better-reply quasiconcave game admits a Nash equilibrium (Reny’s theorem
[23]).
2.2 P-robustness
The following definition plays a central role in all our results.
Definition 1. A payoff function ui is p-robust at x ∈ X if for every ε > 0 and for every neighborhood
Vx−i of x−i, there exists some open neighborhood Vxi of xi such that sup
x′i∈Vxi
inf
x′−i∈Vx−i
u(x′i, x
′
−i) ≤ ui(x) + ε.
The payoff function ui is p-robust if this holds for every x ∈ X. If for every i ∈ N , ui is p-robust, then
we say that G is p-robust.
Thus, ui is p-robust if player i cannot largely improve his payoff by modifying slightly his strategy,
if he anticipates the worst local possible modification of other players’ strategies. If ui was not p-robust
at x, a pessimistic player could have some incentive to slightly modify his strategy xi. In particular,
games with continuous payoff functions are p-robust. Many discontinuous economic games are p-robust.
As remarked in the introduction, first-price auctions are p-robust, which remains true in case of equal
sharing rule (although in this case this game is no more better-reply secure). Other examples are second-
price auctions, Bertrand’s price competition, Cournot’s model of oligopoly, Hotelling’s model of spatial
competition, timing game, etc.
Example 2. Consider a game G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), let x ∈ X, and assume that for every neighbor-
hood Vx−i of x−i, there exists some mapping ψ−i from some neighborhood of xi into Vx−i , continuous at
xi, with ψ−i(xi) = x−i, and such that x′i → ui(x′i, ψ−i(x′i)) is upper semicontinuous on a neighborhood of
xi. Then ui is p-robust at x. Indeed, upper semicontinuity assumption implies that for every ε > 0, there
exists some open neighborhood Vxi of xi such that supx′i∈Vxi ui(x
′
i, ψ−i(x
′
i)) ≤ ui(x) + ε, which implies
p-robustness (from ψ−i continuous at xi, taking Vxi smaller if necessary). Considering the particular case
where ψ−i is the constant mapping equal to x−i, we get that if ui is upper semicontinuous in xi, then it
is p-robust. The criterium above can be applied, for example, to the first-price auctions described in the
introduction: at every (x, x) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1], we can choose ψ−i(x′i) = x′i.
P-robustness assumption is fundamentally different from better-reply security or its generalizations.
As the following example shows, there is no direct relationship between better-reply security and p-
robustness.
Example 3. Consider a two-player game with X1 = X2 = [0, 1], u1(x1, x2) = −(x1 − x2)2 for every
(x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2, u2(0, x2) = x2 for every x2 ∈ [0, 1] and u2(x1, x2) = −x2 for every (x1, x2) ∈]0, 1]× [0, 1].
This game is p-robust, but it is not better-reply secure (because it is quasiconcave and does not possess
any Nash equilibria). Conversely, define v1(0, 0) = 0, v1(x1, x2) = 1 for every (x1, x2) 6= (0, 0), and
v2(x1, x2) = x2. This game is better-reply secure, but v1 is not p-robust at (0, 0).
Example 4. A game G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) is called piecewise upper semicontinuous if for every player
i, there exist a partition (Xk,i)k∈Ki of X such that for every k ∈ Ki:
(1) The multivalued function xi → {x−i ∈ X−i : (xi, x−i) ∈ Xk,i} is lower semicontinuous.4
4Let A and B be two topological spaces. A multivalued function Φ from A to B is lower semicontinuous if for every
open subset V of B, the set {x ∈ A : Φ(x) ∩ V 6= ∅} is an open subset of A.
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(2) The restriction of ui to X
k,i is upper semicontinuous.
In Appendix 6.1, it is proved that a piecewise upper semicontinuous game is p-robust. Many dis-
continuous games are piecewise continuous, and the following criterium is, in general, straighforward to
check in such cases. In particular, it can be simpler to verify than the criterium of Example 2, which
requires to be able to define the auxiliary mapping ψi.
Example 5. Consider the following diagonal game (see Bich and Laraki [4]): for every i ∈ N , we let fi,
gi be upper semicontinuous mappings from [0, 1]× [0, 1] to R, and hi : [0, 1]N → R. The payoff of player
i is:
ui(xi, x−i) =

fi(xi, φ(x−i)) if φ(x−i) > xi,
gi(xi, φ(x−i)) if φ(x−i) < xi,
hi(xi, x−i) if φ(x−i) = xi,
where φ : [0, 1]N−1 → [0, 1] is a continuous mapping such that its (multivalued) inverse φ−1(xi) = {x−i ∈
X−i : xi = φ(x−i)} is lower semicontinuous. This assumption is satisfied, for example, when φ is one of the
following mapping: φ1(y) = max{y1, y2, ..., yN−1}, φ2(y) = min{y1, y2, ..., yN−1}, φ3(y) = 1N−1
∑N−1
j=1 yj ,
or ψk(y) = {k-th highest value of {y1, ..., yN−1}}, k = 1, ..., N − 1. Such functions encompasse many
models of competition with complete information (e.g., some auctions for φ = φ1, wars of attrition,
preemption or Bertrand competition for φ = φ2).
If hi is upper semicontinuous for every i ∈ N , then the diagonal game is piecewise continuous, thus
it is p-robust. Indeed, for every i, we can define Xi,1 = {x ∈ X : xi > φ(x−i)}}, Xi,2 = {x ∈ X : xi <
φ(x−i)}} and Xi,3 = {x ∈ X : xi = φ(x−i)}. Then, the multivalued functions xi → {x−i ∈ X−i : xi >
φ(x−i)} and xi → {x−i ∈ X−i : xi < φ(x−i)} have open graphs, thus are lower semicontinuous. Moreover,
by assumption, the multivalued function xi → {x−i ∈ X−i : xi = φ(x−i)} is lower semicontinuous, which
finally proves piecewise continuity.
Another example of interest is the following case5: assume there are two players, φ1 = φ2 is equal to
identity, and for every x ∈ [0, 1], hi(x, x) ≥ min{fi(x, x), gi(x, x)}. Under these assumptions, we get a
p-robust game. Indeed, consider for example the case (x, x) ∈]0, 1[×]0, 1[ and hi(x, x) ≥ fi(x, x). Define
ψ−i(x′i) = 2x
′
i − x if x′i > x and ψ−i(x′i) = x if x′i ≤ x. Then the mapping x′i → ui(x′i, ψ−i(x′i)) is upper
semicontinuous on a neighborhood of x, thus we can apply the criterium of Example 2. The other cases
are similar.
2.3 Solution concept
2.3.1 λ−equilibrium
To every game we can associate an auxiliary ”prudent” game as follows:
Definition 6. Let Fi be the set of continuous6 real-valued functions c from X−i ×X−i to [0,+∞] such
that c(x−i, y−i) = 0 if and only if x−i = y−i. Let c = (ci)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NFi. For every λ > 0, the λ−prudent
game associated to G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) is Gλ = ((Xi)i∈N , (uλi )i∈N ), where for each player i ∈ N ,
uλi (xi, x−i) = inf
y−i∈X−i
{
ui(xi, y−i) +
ci(x−i, y−i)
λ
}
. (2)
5It can be applied, for example, to non-zero-sum, noisy games of timing (see Example 3.1. in [23]).
6The set [0,+∞] is endowed with the topology induced by the usual topology of the extended real line [−∞,+∞].
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A λ−prudent-equilibrium (or λ−equilibrium7) of G is a Nash equilibrium of Gλ.
The first important properties of the auxiliary game Gλ are given in the following proposition. The
proof can be found in Appendix 6.2.
Proposition 7. For every quasiconcave game G:
1. Gλ is quasiconcave.
2. For every xi ∈ Xi, x−i → uλi (xi, x−i) is continuous.
3. If G is p-robust, then uλi is upper semicontinuous with respect to x.
4. uλi ≤ ui ≤ ui.
For example, a natural choice in Definition 6 is ci(x−i, y−i) = d−i(x−i, y−i)αi for some αi > 0, where
d−i is any product distance on X−i of the dj (j 6= i). The infimum in the definition of uλi means that
each player of Gλ is prudent (or pessimistic) with respect to the rationality8 of opponents. The function
ci(x−i,y−i)
λ allows to weight differently opponents’ actions, and could be interpreted in several ways: as
discussed in the introduction, it may be seen as a functional index related to strategic uncertainty of
player i about other players’ strategies. Another interpretation is that it is a (free) insurance payed to
player i if the other players −i play y−i instead of the predicted strategy x−i. This ”insurance” can
be seen as an abstract way to modelize the degree of confidence9 that player i has in his belief that
opponents will respect their Nash equilibrium strategies. A last interpretation is related to ambiguity:
the set of strategies of opponents can be seen as a set of deterministic priors, and ci(xi,y−i)λ is a measure
of ambiguity on the other players’ strategies. In particular, ci(xi,y−i)λ = 0 means a maximal ambiguity
(which implies that player i will act as a maximin player), and ci(xi,y−i)λ = +∞ that there is no ambiguity
at all.
In each interpretation above, the functions ci parametrize some local shape (of degree of confidence,
ambiguity index, etc.), and λ > 0 parametrizes the level of the ambiguity. The case λ → 0 corresponds
to perfect insurance against strategic uncertainty, or perfect confidence, or minimal ambiguity. On the
opposite, when λ → +∞, players are getting closer to maximin agents, which corresponds to maximal
ambiguity or minimal confidence level.
This could be formalized as follows:10 first recall that a maximin strategy for player i ∈ N is a strategy
x∗i ∈ Xi such that
inf
x−i∈X−i
ui(x
∗
i , x−i) = sup
xi∈Xi
inf
x−i∈X−i
ui(xi, x−i)
A maximin equilibrium of G is a profile of strategies x = (xi)i∈N such that xi is a maximin strategy
for every player i.
7The notion of λ−equilibrium is actually parametrized by λ and c, but in many applications, we will be interested by
comparative static effects of λ for a fixed c.
8We quote Aumann and Brandenburger [3]: ”Suppose that each player is rational (i.e. he maximizes his utility given his
beliefs), knows his own payoff function, and knows the strategy choices of the others. Then the players’ choices constitute
a Nash equilibrium in the game being played.” This explains what is meant by a rational player or a rational action in this
paper. Naturally, such definition of rationality might be discussed: see, for example, [25]
9In [12], Eichberger and Kelsey use capacities to modelize ambiguity and degree of confidence in a strategic game.
10A similar idea that maximin behavior in a game can be supported by beliefs that show extreme ambiguity has first
been proposed in [18].
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Proposition 8. 1. For every p-robust game11 G, any limit of λn−equilibria where λn tends to +∞
is a maximin equilibrium.
2. For every better-reply secure game G, the limit of λn−equilibria where λn tends to 0 is a Nash
equilibrium.
The proof can be found in Appendix 6.3
If Xi = Xj for every (i, j) ∈ N2, then we can introduce the following index which compares locally
the prudent behaviour of two players. Applications can be found in Example 23 or in Example 27.
Definition 9. Suppose that Xi = Xj for every (i, j) ∈ N2. We define the relative prudence pi|j(x) of
player i with respect to player j at x ∈ XN−11 , when it exists, by
pi|j(x) = lim
(x′,x′′)→(x,x)
cj(x
′, x′′)
ci(x′, x′′)
.
If this limit is equal to 0, we say that Player j is infinitely more prudent than player i at x ∈ XN−11 .
Given a strategy profile of opponents x, if pi|j(x) increases, then prudence of player i increases
(compared with that of player j) locally around x. Prudence measures how much each player takes into
account possible modifications of other players’ strategies around x. For example, if Xi is a normed space
for every i ∈ N , cj(x′, x′′) = ‖x′ − x′′‖k and ci(x′, x′′) = ‖x′ − x′′‖l with k > l, then player j is infinitely
more prudent than player i.
2.4 Characterizing our class of utility functions
Given some function ci ∈ Fi, the following proposition characterizes payoff functions vi that are ”prudent
payoffs”, i.e. which can be written
vi(xi, x−i) = inf
y−i∈X−i
{
ui(xi, y−i) +
ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
}
(3)
for some other payoff function ui.
Proposition 10. Assume that ci ∈ Fi defines a distance on X−i×X−i. Let vi be a quasiconcave payoff
function. There exists a quasiconcave payoff function ui satisfying Equation 3 if and only if
∀(x, y−i) ∈ X ×X−i, | vi(xi, x−i)− vi(xi, y−i) |≤ ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
. (4)
The proof can be found in Appendix 6.4.
2.5 Existence of λ−equilibria in piecewise u.s.c. games
We now state a first important result of this paper.
11If we remove p-robustness, we can get similarly that any limit of λn−equilibria where λn tends to +∞ is a sequence of
εn-maximin equilibra for some sequence εn converging to 0.
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Theorem 11. Let c = (ci)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NFi and G be a quasiconcave and p-robust game. For every λ > 0,
there exists a λ−equilibrium.
Indeed, from Proposition 7, Gλ is a compact and quasiconcave game, uλi is upper semicontinuous with
respect to x and continuous with respect to x−i. Thus, for every λ > 0, Gλ possesses a Nash equilibrium
(see, for example, Theorem 2 in [8]) .
3 Prudent equilibrium and refinement of Nash equilibrium in
better-reply secure games
Refinement theory refers to the selection of particular equilibria which are more plausible. Many refine-
ment concepts exist in literature: in his seminal paper, Selten [27] introduces trembling hand perfect
equilibrium and proves its existence in finite-strategy games. Roughly, the idea is to select equilibria
which are immune to small mistakes of the other players. Here, a mistake is formalized by a mixed
strategy close to the initial strategy. Perfect equilibria have been refined in several direction: Myerson
[21] introduces proper equilibria, where players are more likely to make mistake in direction that are least
harmfull to them. Kohlberg and Mertens [15] defines stable-equilibrium notion, which requires stronger
requirements than perfect equilibrium; Simon and Stinchcombe [28] extend perfect and proper equilibria
to infinite normal-form games. 12
To the best of our knowledge, there is no general existence result of refined Nash equilibrium in
discontinous games with pure strategies. This section proposed such a result.13
Definition 12. A strategy profile x ∈ X is a prudent equilibrium of G if there exists c = (ci)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NFi
such that x is the limit of λn-equilibria for λn → 0. The strategy profile x is a strictly prudent equilibrium
if this holds for any c ∈ F .
Remark 13. Andersson et al. [2] were the first to propose a notion of robustness to strategic uncertainty.
They consider a family F of strictly positive probability density functions φij (on Xj) for each couple of
distinct players i 6= j. For every t > 0, they define a t-equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium of the game whose
payoff of player i at x ∈ X is ui(xi, (xj + tεij)j 6=i), where εij ∼ φij are statistically independent random
variables. Then, robust and strictly robust equilibria are defined, as in Definition 12, by considering
limits of t-equilibria when t tends to zero. Existence of robust equilibria requires (1) continuity of the
payoffs (2) concavity of each ui with respect to xi. Moreover, Andersson et al. [2] proves that robust
equilibrium refines Nash equilibrium when the game is continuous.
The following proposition recalls that Prudent equilbrium refines Nash equilibrium in better-reply
secure games.
12All these refinement concepts use perturbations (or ”mistakes”) of the equilibrium strategies. Other refinement concepts
consider perturbations in the payoffs of the game (essential-equilibria [29] or regular-equilibria [13]). This is not connected
with our paper.
13Andersson et al. [2] introduces a refinement notion with pure strategies, but the beliefs on other mistakes are random
variables with probability density functions. Similarly, Carbonell-Nicolau ([7], [6])) extends perfect equilibrium concept to
some classes of discontinuous games: the notion of robustness considered uses perturbations of players’ strategies which are
random variables.
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Proposition 14. For every better-reply secure game, a prudent equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. This is a consequence of Proposition 8.
Theorem 15. For every compact, quasiconcave and p-robust game, there exists a prudent equilibrium.
Proof. By definition of prudent equilibrium, for every sequence (λn)n∈N converging to 0, any limit point
of Nash equilibria of Gλ
n
(which exist from Theorem 11) is a prudent equilibrium.
Applications are given in Section 5. For example, it is proved that in first-price sealed-bid auctions
with complete information, prudent equilibrium concept selects the unique natural solution, although
there is a continuum of such solutions. In case of ties, if the winner is the player with the highest
value (Example 27), then the game is better-reply secure and the unique prudent equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium from Proposition 14. If we now consider an equal sharing rule (Example 29), then the game
is no more better-reply secure. There is no Nash equilibrium, but a familly of approximate equilibria,
and the unique prudent equilibrium is the ”natural” approximate Nash equilibrium of the game. Thus,
Theorem 15 can refine Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium.
4 Extensions and developments
4.1 Symmetric games
The results of the previous sections can be improved upon when the game possesses enough symmetry.
Following Reny [23], a game G is symmetric14 if:
(1) For every players (i, j) ∈ N ×N , Xi = Xj . We denote X = X1 = ... = XN .
(2) For every (x, y) ∈ X × X, u1(x, y, ..., y) = u2(y, x, y, ..., y) = ... = uN (y, ..., y, x). We denote
v(x, y) = u1(x, y, ..., y) = ... = uN (y, ..., y, x).
Thus, a symmetric game can be summarized by G = (X, v).
A symmetric game G = (X, v) is strongly diagonally quasiconcave (Reny [23]) if X is convex, and
if v(x, y) is quasiconcave in x. The game G is diagonally better-reply secure if for every (x∗, v∗) which
belongs to {(x, v(x, x)) : x ∈ X}), where (x∗, ..., x∗) is not a Nash equilibrium, then there exists d ∈ X
and ε > 0 such that v(d, x′) > v∗ + ε for every x′ ∈ X in some neighborhood of x∗.
Finally, Recall that a Nash equilibrium (x∗1, ..., x
∗
N ) is symmetric if x
∗
1 = ... = x
∗
N .
Theorem 16. (Reny [23])
Every symmetric, compact, diagonally quasiconcave and diagonally better-reply secure game possesses
a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium.
We now adapt Definition 1 and Definition 6 to symmetric games:
Definition 17. The symmetric game G = (X, v) is symmetrically p-robust if for every x ∈ X, for every
ε > 0 and for every neighborhood Vx of x in X, there exists some open neighborhood Wx ⊂ X of x such
that sup
x′∈Vx
inf
x′′∈Wx
v(x′, x′′) ≤ v(x, x) + ε.
14Reny uses the terminology of ”quasi-symmetric” game.
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Adapting Example 4, it can be proved that every symmetric game G = (X, v) is symmetrically p-
robust whenever it is symmetrically piecwise u.s.c., which means that there exist a partition (Xk)k∈K of
X2 which satisfies the two following conditions:
(1) For every k ∈ K, the multivalued functions x→ {x′ ∈ X : (x, x′) ∈ Xk} is lower semicontinuous.
(2) For every k ∈ K, the restriction of v to Xk is upper semicontinuous.
Definition 18. Let F be the set of continuous real-valued functions c from X×X to [0,+∞], such that
c(x, x′) = 0 if and only if x = x′. Let c ∈ F . For every λ > 0, the symmetric λ−prudent game associated
to the symmetric game G = (X, v) is the symmetric game Gλsym = (X, v
λ), where
vλ(x, x′) = inf
x′′∈X
{
vi(x, x
′′) +
c(x′′, x′)
λ
}
(5)
A symmetric λ−equilibrium of G is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of Gλ. A strategy profile x ∈ X
is a symmetric prudent equilibrium of G if there exists c ∈ F such that x is the limit of symmetric
λn-equilibria for λn → 0. The strategy profile x is a symmetric strictly prudent equilibrium if this holds
for any c ∈ F .
Remark 19. There are two modifications with respect to the definitions of the previous sections. First,
the perturbations of the other players’ strategies are symmetric, which implies that the symmetric prudent
game Gλsym is in general different from the prudent game G
λ (except in two-player games). Second, the
sequence of λn-equilibria considered in Definition 18 has to be symmetric, which is a strenghtening
of Definition 12. In particular, in two-player symmetric games, symmetric prudent equilibrium refines
prudent equilibrium.
The proof of the following theorem is similar to this of Theorem 11 and Proposition 14.
Theorem 20. Let c ∈ F and G be a compact, symmetric, diagonally quasiconcave and symmetrically
p-robust game.
(1) For every λ > 0, there exists a symmetric λ−equilibrium.
(2) There exists a symmetric prudent equilibrium, and for every diagonally better-reply secure game,
this is a Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Beyond p-robust games: strategic approximation.
The idea of the previous sections can be extended to any quasiconcave game G as follows. For every
finite subsets Xf =
∏
i∈N X
f
i of X and every sequence (λk)k∈N of positive reals converging to zero, we
can quasiconcavify the prudent game Gλk on Xf as follows: for every player i ∈ N and every integer
k ≥ 0, define u˜ki on co(Xf ) = ΠNi=1co(Xfi ) by
u˜ki (xi, x−i) = sup{min{uλki (y1i , x−i), ..., uλki (yni , x−i)}}
over all n ∈ N and all families {y1i , ..., yni } of Xfi such that xi ∈co{y1i , ..., yni }. Since Xf is finite and
uλki is continuous with respect to the second argument, it is easy to see that u˜
k
i is upper semicontinuous
with respect to x and continuous with respect to x−i. Thus, for every integer k ≥ 0, there exists a Nash
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equilibrium xk of the game G˜k = (co(Xf ), u˜ki )i∈N (see, for example, Theorem 2 in [8]). The proof of the
following proposition can be found in Appendix 6.5.
Proposition 21. Let G be a quasiconcave and better-reply secure game. There exists a sequence of
finite approximations Xk ⊂ X such that any limit point of Nash equilibria of (coXk, u˜ki )i∈N is a Nash
equilibrium of G.
Following Reny [24], let us define a strategic approximation of G as ”a countable subset of pure
strategies with the property that limits of all equilibria of all sequences of approximating games whose
finite strategy sets eventually include each member of the countable set must be equilibria of the infinite
game”. Thus, Proposition 21 provides a pure strategy strategic approximation of any quasiconcave and
better-reply secure game, and this strategic approximation scheme is based on prudent games.
4.3 Games in mixed strategies
Denote by Mi = ∆(Xi) the set of Borel probability measures on Xi, usually called the set of mixed
strategies of player i. Recall it is a compact, Hausdorff and metrizable set under the weak* topology. To
every game G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), we associate its mixed strategy extension G′ = ((Mi)i∈N , (u˜i)i∈N ),
where u˜i is the multi-linear extension of ui to M . Most techniques introduced in the previous sections
can be applied to G′. In particular:
Corollary 22. Let G be compact game. Then its mixed extension G′ possesses a prudent equilibrium if
G′ is p-robust.
A difficulty is to get sufficient conditions for p-robustness in mixed strategies. In general, p-robustness
of G does not imply p-robustness of its mixed extension: consider the two player game defined by
X1 = X2 = [0, 1], u2 = 0, u1(x1, x2) = 0 if x1 = x2 and u1(x1, x2) = 1 otherwise. This game is p-robust
(because it is piecewise continuous), but its mixed extension is not: indeed, consider (σ1, σ2) = (0, 0). If
player 1 plays uniformly on a small neighborhood of 0, he obtains a payoff of 1, whatever the strategy of
player 2. Thus, for every ε > 0 small enough, for every neighborhood Vσ2 of σ2, and for every neighborhood
Vσ1 of σ1, sup
σ′1∈Vσ1
inf
σ′2∈Vσ2
u1(σ
′
1, σ
′
2) = 1 > u1(σ1, σ2) + ε = ε, which contradicts p-robustness of G
′.
Since the main objective of this paper is to study games in pure strategies, we do not push further
the case of mixed strategies. At worst, Corollary 22 can be applied to continuous games. See Example
35
5 Examples
5.1 Nash demand game
Example 23. Some amount of money can be split between two players. Each one chooses the share he
demands. Then, each player receives his demand if the demand can be satisfied, and 0 otherwise. If the
total amount of money is normalized at 1, the payoff of seller i is
ui(xi, x−i) =
{
xi if xi + x−i ≤ 1,
0 otherwise
12
This game is compact, quasiconcave and better-reply secure. The set of Nash equilibria is {(1, 1)} ∪
{(x, 1 − x) : x ∈ [0, 1]}. It is a p-robust game (because it is piecewise continuous), thus it possesses a
prudent Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 24. Assume c1 and c2 are distances on [0, 1] × [0, 1]. If the relative prudence p1|2(x) of
player 1 with respect to player 2 at every x ∈ [0, 1] is constant, equal to µ ∈ [0,+∞], then the set of
prudent equilibria is {(1, 1), ( 11+µ , µ1+µ )}.
Proof. By definition, for every x−i < 1 and every xi < 1− x−i,
uλi (xi, x−i) = inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(xi, y−i) + ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
} = min{ui(xi, x−i) = xi, ci(1− xi, x−i)
λ
}.
Indeed, the infimum above can reached at y−i = x−i or for y−i → (1 − xi)+. Moreover, for every other
strategy profiles, uλi (xi, x−i) = 0. If (x
λn
1 , x
λn
2 ) is a sequence of Nash equilibria of G
λn which converges to
(x1, x2) when λn tends to zero, then either (x
λn
1 , x
λn
2 ) = (1, 1) for infinitely many n > 0, and at the limit,
this provides the prudent equilibrium (1, 1). Otherwise, up to a subsequence, we can assume that xλni < 1
for i = 1, 2 and xλn1 + x
λn
2 < 1, otherwise one player does not play a best-response in G
λn . Moreover,
since the initial game is better-reply secure, (x1, x2) should be a Nash equilibrium, i.e. x1 = 1 − x2. In
addition, we have λn.x
λn
i = ci(1− xλni , xλn−i) for i = 1, 2 (thus xλni > 0): indeed, otherwise, uλni (x) would
be either equal to xi or to
ci(1−xi,x−i)
λn
for every x on some neighborhood of xλn , thus player i would be
able to improve its payoff in Gλn by increasing or decreasing slightly his strategy. This implies
lim
n→+∞
xλn2
xλn1
=
1− x1
x1
= µ,
thus (x1, x2) = (
1
1+µ ,
µ
1+µ ). In short, the less uncertain player obtains the bigger share.
15
5.2 Hotelling location game
Example 25. Two sellers i = 1, 2 sell the same good at the same price. Each seller i has to find a
location along some street xi ∈ [0, 1]. Consumers are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and each consumer
chooses the closest seller. In case of ties (xi = x−i), it is assumed that the two sellers merge. In this case,
the payoff of each player is assumed to increase of c ∈]0, 12 [ (economies of scale, fixed cost elimination,
etc.). The payoff of seller i is
ui(xi, x−i) =

xi+x−i
2 if xi < x−i,
1
2 + c if xi = x−i
1− xi+x−i2 if xi > x−i,
Proposition 26. The set of Nash equilibria is {(x, x) : x ∈ [ 12−c, 12 +c]}, and ( 12 , 12 ) is the only symmetric
prudent equilibrium.
Proof. First, this game is compact, symmetric, diagonally quasiconcave and diagonally better-reply
secure, second, its set of Nash equilibria is clearly {(x, x) : x ∈ [ 12 − c, 12 + c]}. It is a symmetrically
15A similar idea was first proposed in [1], in a different setting.
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p-robust game (because it is symmetrically piecewise continuous), thus it possesses a symmetric prudent
Nash equilibrium. Let us prove that the only prudent Nash equilibrium is ( 12 ,
1
2 ). Let (x, x) be a symmetric
prudent Nash equilibrium, and assume, for example, x > 12 . By definition, (x, x) is the limit of symmetric
λn-equilibria (x
λn , xλn), where λn converges to zero. Remark that v
λn(xλn , xλn) ≤ 1 − xλn (since the
other player can decrease slightly its location). Moreover, for every ε > 0 small enough, vλn(xλn−ε, xλn)
converges to v(x− ε, x) = x+ ε2 , which is larger than 1− xλn for n large enough. This contradicts that
(xλn , xλn) is a λn-equilibria. The proof is similar when x <
1
2 .
5.3 First-price sealed-bid auctions
Example 27. (First-price auction with maximum value sharing rule)
Two bidders i = 1, 2 submit simultaneous sealed bids xi ∈ [0,M ] to the seller, M > 0. The highest
bidder wins the object and pays the value of her bid. The true values of the bidders are v1 < v2 < M .
The strategy spaces are X1 = X2 = [0,M ], and the payoff of player i is defined by
ui(xi, x−i) =
{
vi − xi if xi > x−i,
0 if xi < x−i
Assume that in case of ties (xi = x−i), the winner is the bidder with the highest valuation, i.e. player
2.
Proposition 28. 1) The set of Nash equilibria is {(x, x) : x ∈ [v1, v2]}. 2) Assume that c1 and c2 are
distances on [0,M ]× [0,M ] and that for every strategy profile (x, x) with x ∈]v1, v2], player 1 is infinitely
more prudent than player 2 at x ∈ X. Then (v1, v1) is the only prudent Nash equilibrium.
First, this game is compact, quasi-concave and better-reply secure. Second, clearly, the set of Nash
equilibria is the set of profiles {(x1, x1) : x1 ∈ [v1, v2]}. The game is piecewise continuous (see Example
4), thus is is p-robust. Hence, there exists a prudent Nash equilibrium (Theorem 15 and Proposition 14.)
Let (x, x) be a Nash equilibrium, with x > v1. For player 2, a possible deviation x
′
1 of player 1 does
not matter if x′1 < x, and x
′
1 > x seems unlikely (it seems more probable that player 1 will deviate for
some strategy that weakly dominates x, like x1 = v1). For player 1, a deviation x
′
2 < x of player 2 really
matters, because it implies a negative payoff v1 − x, that could be avoided by playing x1 = v1. Thus,
the assumption that player 1 is infinitely more prudent than player 2 at x seems reasonable. Under this
assumption, we get only one prudent Nash equilibrium which is (v1, v1) (see the proof in appendix 6.6.)
Example 29. (First-price auction with equal sharing rule)
Consider the game defined in Example 27, but now assume equal sharing rule, that is ui(xi, x−i) =
vi−xi
2 if xi = x−i. There is no Nash equilibrium, because at (x, x), one player should deviate. But
the game is still p-robust and quasiconcave, thus possesses a prudent equilibrium. Moreover, there is a
continuum of approximate equilibria: for every x ∈ [v1, v2], (x, x) is an approximate equilibrium, meaning
that it is the limit of the 1n−Nash equilibrium profiles (x, x+ 1n ). Yet, following the proof of Proposition
28, we get:
Proposition 30. 1) The set of approximate Nash equilibria is {(x, x) : x ∈ [v1, v2]}. 2) Assume that
c1 and c2 are distances on [0,M ]× [0,M ]. Assume that for every strategy profile (x, x) with x ∈]v1, v2],
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player 1 is infinitely more prudent than player 2 at x ∈ X. Then (v1, v1) is the only prudent approximate
Nash equilibrium.
5.4 Bertrand duopoly with symmetric costs
Example 31. Consider16 N identical firms competing for a homogenous good. Aggregate demand is a
function D : [0,+∞[→ [0,+∞[, and all firms have the same cost function C : [0,+∞[→ [0,+∞[. For
every integer m ∈ {1, ...N}, let vm(p) = pD(p)m −C(D(p)m ) for every p ∈ [0,+∞[. This is the profit of each
of m firms which choose a same price p, when all other firms choose higher prices. Define a symmetric
game as follows: firm i ∈ N chooses a price pi ∈ X = [0,+∞[. Given a strategy profile p = (pi)i∈N , the
payoff of firm i is
pii(p) =
{
vcard{j:pj=pi}(pi) if pi = min{p1, ..., pN},
0 otherwise
We assume the following:17
1. v1 and vN are continuous.
2. There exists pmax > 0 such that vN (p
max) = 0 and vN (p) < 0 for every p > p
max.
3. There exists a unique pˇN ∈]0, pmax[ and a unique pˆN ∈]pˇN , pmax], such that vN (pˇN ) = 0 and
vN (pˆN ) = v1(pˆN ).
4. There exists a unique price p¯ ∈]pˇN , pˆN [ such that v1(p¯) = 0 (price at which a monopolist makes a
zero profit), where v1(p) > 0 for every p > p¯ and v1(p) < 0 for every p < p¯.
5. For every p > pˆN v1(p) > vN (p).
6. pii(p1, p2, ..., p2) is quasiconcave in p1 on X = [pˇN , p
max] for every p2 ∈ X.
7. For every pi < pˇn and every m ∈ {1, ...N}, vm(pi) < 0.
From this last assumption, without any loss of generality, we can restrict the strategies to X =
[pˇN , p
max]. Call G the game thus defined.
In the following proposition, we assume that c is a distance on [0,+∞[.
Proposition 32. (1) The set of Nash equilibria of the game G above is {(p, ..., p) : p ∈ [pˇN , pˆN ]}.
(2) (p¯, ..., p¯) is the unique symmetric prudent equilibrium of G.
Remark that this game is symmetrically p-robust, symmetric, compact, diagonally quasiconcave and
diagonally better-reply secure. See the proof in Appendix 6.7.
16This presentation of Bertrand duopoly model follows partially [2].
17See [9] or [2] for natural assumptions on C and D that implies these properties.
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5.5 Link with strategic uncertainty notion of Andersson et al.
These two first examples show that prudent equilibrium concept does not coincide with Andersson et al.
robust equilibrium concept.
Example 33. In this example, we provide a differentiable game where Andersson et al. robustness
concept refines prudent equilibrium. Consider a two-player game with X1 = X2 = [0, 1],
u1(x1, x2) =
{
x1.(2x2 − 1) if 12 ≤ x2 ≤ 1,
0 otherwise
and
u2(x1, x2) = −(x1 − x2)2
It is a compact and quasiconcave game. The strategy profile (0, 0) is not robust to uncertainty. Indeed,
for every familly F of strictly positive probability density functions φij (on Xj), εij ∼ φij statistically
independent random variables, and t > 0, we have u1(0, 0 + tεij)j 6=i) = 0 and u1(1, 0 + tεij)j 6=i) > 0, thus
playing 0 is not optimal for player 1 in the perturbed game. Yet (0, 0) is a prudent equilibria: indeed,
uλ(0, 0) = 0 ≥ uλ(x1, 0) = 0 for every x1 ∈ [0, 1] and for λ > 0 small enough, because u1(0, x2) = 0 =
u1(x1, x2) for every x1 ∈ [0, 1] and every x2 in some neighborhood of 0.
Example 34. We provide an example of a game with a continuum of Nash equilibria, with only one
prudent Nash equilibrium, and where every strategy profile is robust to uncertainty in the sense of
Andersson et al. [2]. Consider the symmetric two-player game with Xi = [0, 1] for i = 1, 2 and
ui(xi, x−i) =
{
0 if xi < x−i and x−i ∈ lQ,
1 otherwise
This game is p-robust (because each ui is u.s.c. in xi). From Theorem 15, there exists a prudent
equilibrium. Let us prove that for every c ∈ F , (1, 1) is the only prudent equilibrium. Clearly, (x1, x2)
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if ui(xi, x−i) = 1, i = 1, 2, or equivalently if x1 = x2 or [x1 < x2 and
x2 /∈ lQ] or [x2 < x1 and x1 /∈ lQ]. Moreover, for every c ∈ F and every λ > 0, uλi (xi, x−i) = 0 for every
xi ≤ x−i if x−i < 1. Indeed, under these conditions,
uλi (xi, x−i) = inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(xi, y−i)+ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
} ≤ ui(xi, x−i+εn)+ci(x−i + εn, x−i)
λ
=
ci(x−i + εn, x−i)
λ
where εn > 0 can be chosen so that x−i+εn ∈ lQ∩[0, 1], x−i+εn > xi and such that (εn)n∈N converges
to 0. Passing to the limit as εn → 0, we get uλi (xi, x−i) = 0 from the continuity of c and c(x−i, x−i) = 0.
Moreover, uλi (1, x−i) = 1 for every x−i ∈ [0, 1], thus a best reply of player i to a strategy x−i < 1 is
strictly larger than x−i, and xi = 1 is the unique best-reply to x−i = 1 in Gλ. Thus, the unique Nash
equilibrium of Gλ is (1, 1), and (1, 1) is finally a (strictly) prudent equilibrium, and the only one.
Now, for every familly F of strictly positive probability density functions φij (on Xj), εij ∼ φij
statistically independent random variables, and t > 0, we have ui(xi, (xj + tεij)j 6=i) = 1. Thus every
(xi, x−i) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] is strictly robust in the sense of Andersson et al. (even if x is not a Nash
equilibrium).
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5.6 Example of a prudent equilibrium in mixed strategies
Example 35. Consider the following two-player finite game:
A B
a (0, 0) (−1, 0)
b (0,−1) (0, 0)
Let G be the mixed extension of this game. Every strategy of player 1 (resp. of player 2) can be
written (λ, 1 − λ) ∈ [0, 1]2, where λ is the probability of a (resp. A), and 1 − λ is the probability of b
(resp. B). Assume that c is quadratique, i.e. more precisely that c((λ, 1 − λ), (λ′, 1 − λ′)) = (λ − λ′)2.
There are two Nash equilibria which are (a,A) and (b, B). Only (b, B) is perfect.
Let us prove that (a,A) is not a prudent equilibrium. Indeed, by contradiction, assume that (σn1 , σ
n
2 )
is a Nash equilibrium of Gλ
n
for λn → 0, where (σn1 , σn2 ) converges to (a,A) = ((1, 0), (1, 0)). Then,
uλn1 (σ
n
1 , σ
n
2 ) ≥ uλn1 (b, σn2 ) = 0 which is only possible if σn2 = A, and by a symmetric argument σn1 = a.
But then, by definition of uλn1 ,
uλn1 (a,A) ≤ uλn1 (a, αnB + (1− αn)A) +
c(αnB + (1− αn)A,A)
λn
= −αn + α
2
n
λn
where αn > 0 can be chosen small enough for every n > 0 such that −αn + α
2
n
λn is negative. Then we get
uλn1 (a,A) < 0 = u
λn
1 (b, A). But this contradicts that (a,A) is a Nash equilibrium of G
λn .
6 Appendix
6.1 Example 4: a piecewise upper semicontinuous game is p-robust
Let G be a piecewise upper semicontinuous game. We first prove the following claim:
Claim 36. For every open neighborhood Vx−i of x−i ∈ X−i, inf
x′−i∈Vx−i
ui(xi, x
′
−i) is upper semicontinuous with
respect to xi.
Proof. Let a ∈ R, Vx−i be an open neighborhood of x−i ∈ X−i, and (xni )n∈N be a sequence of strategy profiles
converging to xi ∈ X, and such that for every integer n,
inf
x′−i∈Vx−i
ui(x
n
i , x
′
−i) ≥ a.
For every k ∈ Ki, let Xk,i−i (xi) = {x−i ∈ X−i : (xi, x−i) ∈ Xk,i}. Let k ∈ Ki such that x−i ∈ Xk,i−i (xi).
Since Xk,i−i ∩ Vx−i is a lower semicontinuous multivalued function (since Xk,i−i is lower semicontinuous and Vx−i
is open), considering a subsequence of (xni )n∈N if necessary, there exists a sequence x
n
−i converging to x−i such
that xn−i ∈ Xk,i−i (xni ) ∩ Vx−i . In particular, ui(xni , xn−i) ≥ a for n large enough. Passing to the limit, from upper
semicontinuity of the restriction of ui to X
k,i, we get ui(xi, x−i) ≥ a. Passing to the infimum with respect to
x−i ∈ Vx−i , we get finally
inf
x′−i∈Vx−i
ui(xi, x
′
−i) ≥ a
which ends the proof of the claim.
Now, to prove that G is p-robust, consider ε > 0 and let Vx−i be an open neighborhood of x−i. From the claim
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above, there exists Vxi such that for every x
′
i ∈ Vxi ,
inf
x′−i∈Vx−i
ui(x
′
i, x
′
−i) ≤ inf
x′−i∈Vx−i
ui(xi, x
′
−i) + ε ≤ ui(x) + ε,
which proves p-robustness.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 7
(1) Remark that uλi (xi, x−i) is the infimum of a family of functions which are quasiconcave in xi, thus it is qua-
siconcave in xi.
(2) First note that uλi (xi, x−i) is the infimum of a family of functions which are continuous in x−i. Thus it is
upper semicontinuous in x−i. To prove it is lower semicontinuous in x−i, consider a sequence (xn−i)n∈N converging
to some x−i, and such that uλi (xi, x
n
−i) ≤ α for some real α and for every integer n ≥ 0. By definition,
inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(xi, y−i) + ci(y−i, x
n
−i)
λ
} ≤ α
for every integer n. Given ε > 0, this implies that there is a sequence yn−i ∈ X−i such that
ui(xi, y
n
−i) +
ci(x
n
−i, y
n
−i)
λ
≤ α+ ε.
Since ci is continuous on the compact set X−i ×X−i, it is uniformly continuous, thus
ui(xi, y
n
−i) +
ci(x−i, yn−i)
λ
≤ α+ 2ε
for n large enough. Passing to the infimum with respect to the second variable yn−i, we get u
λ
i (xi, x−i) ≤ α+ 2ε.
Since this is true for every ε > 0, this finally proves (2).
(3) Assume G is p-robust, and prove that uλi is u.s.c. in x. Take a ∈ R and consider a sequence (xn)n∈N of
strategy profiles converging to x ∈ X, and such that uλi (xn) ≥ a for every integer n. We have to prove that
uλi (x) ≥ a. By definition of (xn)n∈N, for every integer n ∈ N
inf
y−i∈X−i
{
ui(x
n
i , y−i) +
ci(y−i, xn−i)
λ
}
≥ a.
Let ε > 0 and y−i ∈ X−i. By p-robustness, for every integer k ∈ N, choosing Vy−i = B(y−i, 1k ), there is some
open neighborhood V kxi of xi such that: for every x
′
i ∈ V kxi , there exists yk−i ∈ B(y−i, 1k ) such that
u(x′i, y
k
−i) ≤ ui(xi, y−i) + ε
In particular, for every k, there is nk large enough such that for every n ≥ nk, there is yn−i ∈ B(y−i, 1k ) such
that
ui(x
n
i , y
n
−i) ≤ ui(xi, y−i) + ε
Thus
ui(x
n
i , y
n
−i) +
ci(y
n
−i, x
n
−i)
λ
≤ ui(xi, y−i) + ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
+ (
ci(y
n
−i, x
n
−i)
λ
− ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
) + ε,
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From continuity of ci, for k large enough and n ≥ nk, we get
ui(x
n
i , y
n
−i) +
ci(y
n
−i, x
n
−i)
λ
≤ ui(xi, y−i) + ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
+ 2ε
Passing to the infimum with respect to y−i in the right-hand side, then to the infimum with respect to yn−i in
the left-hand side, we get, for n large enough:
a ≤ uλi (xn) ≤ uλi (x) + 2ε.
Consequently, uλi is an u.s.c. function of x
For the last point, take x ∈ X, and consider a sequence (xn−i)n∈N converging to x−i such that ui(x) =
limn→+∞ ui(xi, xn−i). By definition
uλi (xi, x−i) = inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(xi, y−i) + ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
} ≤ ui(xi, xn−i) + ci(x
n
−i, x−i)
λ
.
Passing to the limit, we get uλi (xi, x−i) ≤ ui(xi, x−i).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 8
(1) Let (λn)n∈N be a sequence of non negative reals converging to +∞, and (xn)n∈N be a sequence of λn-equilibria
converging to x ∈ X. By definition of a Nash equilibrium in the game Gλn , we get
∀i ∈ N, ∀di ∈ Xi, inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(di, y−i) + ci(y−i, x
n
−i)
λn
} ≤ inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(xni , y−i) + ci(y−i, x
n
−i)
λn
} (6)
Since ci is continuous and X is compact, for every ε > 0, there exists n large enough such that
∀i ∈ N, ∀di ∈ Xi, inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(di, y−i)} ≤ inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(xni , y−i)}+ ε (7)
i.e. xni is a ε−maximin strategy for player i for n large enough. From Claim 36, infy−i∈X−i{ui(xi, y−i)} is u.s.c.
with respect to xi. Thus, passing to the limit when n→ +∞ and ε→ 0 in the above inequality, we get
∀i ∈ N, ∀di ∈ Xi, inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(di, y−i)} ≤ inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(xi, y−i)} (8)
that is x is a maximin equilibrium.
(2) We will use the following Claim, which lists some additional important properties of uλi .
Claim 37. Let G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a game, and Gλ = ((Xi)i∈N , (uλi )i∈N ) the λ-prudent game associated
to G.
1. If xn−i → x−i and λn → 0 then for every xi ∈ Xi, lim infn→+∞ uλni (xi, xn−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i).
2. For every x ∈ X, uλni (xi, x−i) tends to ui(xi, x−i) when λn tends to 0.
3. uλi (xi, x−i) = infy−i∈X−i{ui(xi, y−i) + ci(x−i,y−i)λ }
Proof of Claim 37. For the first point of the claim, let xn−i → x−i and consider a sequence (λn)n∈N converging
to 0. By definition,
uλni (xi, x
n
−i) = inf
y−i∈X−i
{ui(xi, y−i) + ci(y−i, x
n
−i)
λn
}.
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Let ε > 0. By definition of infimum, there is a sequence yn−i ∈ X−i such that
uλni (xi, x
n
−i) ≥ ui(xi, yn−i) + ci(x
n
−i, y
n
−i)
λn
− ε.
Since the sequence uλni (xi, x
n
−i) is bounded, this implies that the sequence
ci(x
n
−i,y
n
−i)
λn
is bounded, thus yn−i
converges to x−i (because λn converges to 0). Moreover, since ci ≥ 0, we get
uλni (xi, x
n
−i) ≥ ui(xi, yn−i)− ε,
and passing to the infimum limit as n→ +∞, then taking ε→ 0, we get 1.
For the second point of the claim, use the first property with a constant sequence xn−i = x−i, and Point 4 in
Proposition 7.
For the last point of the claim, first note that the inequality uλi (xi, x−i) ≥ infy−i∈X−i{ui(xi, y−i) + ci(x−i,y−i)λ }
is obvious. To prove the converse inequality, let ε > 0 and y¯−i ∈ X−i such that infy−i∈X−i{ui(xi, y−i) +
ci(x−i,y−i)
λ
} ≥ ui(xi, y¯−i) + ci(x−i,y¯−i)λ − ε. By definition of ui and from the continuity of ci, there exists a
sequence yn−i ∈ X−i, converging to y¯−i, such that ui(xi, y¯−i) + ci(x−i,y¯−i)λ − ε ≥ ui(xi, yn−i) +
ci(x−i,yn−i)
λ
− 2ε for
n large enough. Passing to the infimum with respect to the second variable in the right-hand side, we finally get
infy−i∈X−i{ui(xi, y−i) + ci(x−i,y−i)λ } ≥ uλi (xi, x−i)− 2ε, which ends the proof of the Claim.
Now, we prove the second part of Proposition 8. Assume G is a better reply secure game, let λn be a
sequence of non negative reals converging to 0, and xn be a sequence of λn-equilibria which converges to x. From
compacity of Γ, without any loss of generality, up to a subsequence, we can assume that (xn, u(xn)) converges to
some (x, v) ∈ Γ. By definition,
∀i ∈ N, ∀di ∈ Xi, uλni (di, xn−i) ≤ uλni (xn) ≤ ui(xn) (9)
the last inequality being a consequence of Proposition 7. Passing to the infimum limit as n→ +∞, and using
Point (1) in the above claim, we get ui(di, x−i) ≤ ui for every i ∈ N and every di ∈ Xi . Since G is better reply
secure, this implies that x is a Nash equilibrium.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 10
First, assume that vi satisfies Equation 3. For every (x, y−i, z−i) ∈ X ×X−i ×X−i, from Equation 3, and since
ci is a distance, we get
vi(xi, x−i) ≤ ui(xi, z−i) + ci(z−i, x−i)
λ
≤ ui(xi, z−i) + ci(z−i, y−i)
λ
+
ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
. (10)
Passing to the infimum with respect to z−i in Equation 10, we get
vi(xi, x−i) ≤ vi(xi, y−i) + ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
,
thus vi satisfies Equation 4.
For the converse implication, we now assume that vi satisfies Equation 4, and we will prove that Equation 3
is true with ui = vi. By definition, we have
vi(xi, x−i) ≥ inf
y−i∈X−i
{vi(xi, y−i) + ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
}
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since we can take y−i = x−i in the infimum and since c(x−i, x−i) = 0. For the converse inequality, remark that
from Equation 4, we have
vi(xi, y−i) +
ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
≥ vi(xi, x−i)
for every y−i ∈ X−i, and passing to the infimum with respect to y−i we finally get
vi(xi, x−i) = inf
y−i∈X−i
{
vi(xi, y−i) +
ci(y−i, x−i)
λ
}
6.5 Proof of Proposition 21
We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 38. If G is quasiconcave and better-reply secure, then there exists a countable set
∏N
i=1 X
′
i ⊂ X such
that for every (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ, if x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium of G, then there exists i ∈ N and di ∈ X ′i such that
ui(di, x
∗
−i) > u
∗
i .
Proof of Lemma 38. Let Γequ = {(x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium} and Γnequ = {(x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ, x∗ is not
a Nash equilibrium} =c Γequ. For every (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γnequ, from better-reply security, there exists some player i and
some strategy d ∈ Xi such that u∗i < ui(d, x∗−i). Since by definition ui is l.s.c. with respect to x−i, there exists
an open neighborhood V(x∗,u∗)(d) of (x
∗, u∗) in Γnequ such that for every (x, u) ∈ V(x∗,u∗)(d), ui < ui(d, x−i).
Since Γ is a compact subset of a metric space, it is separable. Thus Γnequ, as a subset of a separable metric
space, is separable. Thus, it is a Lindelo¨f space18, i.e. every open cover of Γnequ has a countable subcover.
Consequently, there exists a countable covering O of Γnequ by some open neighborhoods Vx∗(j),u∗(j)(d(j)), where
(x∗(j), u∗(j)) ∈ Γnequ, d(j) ∈ ∪Ni=1Xi and j ∈ IN. Now, define X ′i = {d(j), j ∈ IN} ∩Xi if it is nonempty, and X ′i
be any point of Xi otherwise. By construction, it satisfies the conclusion of Lemma above.
To prove Proposition 21, consider an increasing sequence of finite subsets Xk =
∏N
i=1 X
k
i of X such that
∪kXk = X ′ (X ′ being defined in the above lemma) and take a sequence (xk)k∈N of Nash equilibria of the games
(coXk, u˜ki )i∈N . By compactness of X, without any loss of generality, we can suppose that x
k converges to x∗ ∈ X.
By definition of u˜ki and from Point (4) in Proposition 7, we have
u˜ki (x
k
i , x
k
−i) = sup{min{uλki (y1i , xk−i), ..., uλki (yni , xk−i)}} ≤ sup{min{ui(y1i , xk−i), ..., ui(yni , xk−i)}},
the supremum being taken over all n ∈ N and all families {y1i , ..., yni } of Xfi such that xki ∈co{y1i , ..., yni }. From
quasiconcavity of ui with respect to xi, we finally get u˜
k
i (x
k
i , x
k
−i) ≤ ui(xki , xk−i). In addition, the definition of u˜ki
gives u
λk
i (di, x
k
−i) ≤ u˜ki (di, xk−i) for every di ∈ Xki .
Now, fix di ∈ X ′i. For k > 0 large enough, di ∈ Xki , and by definition of xk we get
u
λk
i (di, x
k
−i) ≤ u˜ki (di, xk−i) ≤ u˜ki (xk) ≤ ui(xk).
Passing to the limit as k → +∞, and from Point (1) in Claim 37, we get
∀di ∈ X ′i, ui(di, x∗−i) ≤ u∗i
where (x∗, u∗) ∈ Γ. This proves that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium by construction of X ′.
18Let X be a separable metric space (which means that there exists C, a countable and dense subset of X). Then X is a
Lindelo¨f space, i.e. every open cover of X has a countable subcover.
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6.6 Proof of Proposition 28
We want to prove that (v1, v1) is the unique prudent equilibrium. Assume by contradiction that there is a sequence
of λn-equilibria x
λn = (xλn1 , x
λn
2 ) which converges to (x, x) when λn → 0+, where x ∈]v1, v2]. If xλn1 ≥ xλn2 then
u1(x
λn) = v1 − xλn1 for n large enough. Thus from (4) in Proposition 7, uλn1 (xλn) ≤ v1 − xλn1 < 0 for n large
enough. But, by definition, xλn is a Nash of Gλn , thus for n large enough, we get 0 = uλn1 (0, x
λn
2 ) ≤ uλn1 (xλn) < 0,
a contradiction. Now, we can assume that xλn1 < x
λn
2 for n large enough. By definition,
uλn2 (x
λn) = inf
y1∈[0,M ]
{u2(y1, xλn2 ) +
c2(y1, x
λn
1 )
λn
},
or equivalently
uλn2 (x
λn) = min
{
u2(x
λn) = v2 − xλn2 , inf
y1>x
λn
2
{u2(y1, xλn2 ) +
c2(y1, x
λn
1 )
λn
=
c2(y1, x
λn
1 )
λn
}
}
because u2(x
λn) = v2 − xλn2 < u2(y1, xλn2 ) + c2(y1,x
λn
1 )
λn
= v2 − xλn2 + c2(y1,x
λn
1 )
λn
for every 0 ≤ y1 ≤ xλn2 and
y1 6= xλn1 . Remark also that infy1>xλn2 {
c2(y1,x
λn
1 )
λn
} = c2(x
λn
2 ,x
λn
1 )
λn
because c2 is a distance. Thus finally,
uλn2 (x
λn) = min{v2 − xλn2 ,
c2(x
λn
2 , x
λn
1 )
λn
}.
By continuity, this equality is true on some open neighborhood of xλn . If v2 − xλn2 < c2(x
λn
2 ,x
λn
1 )
λn
, then we get
uλn2 (x
λn
1 , x
′
2) = v2 − x′2 for x′2 close enough to xλn2 which contradicts that xλn2 is a best reply of player 2 (in Gλn)
to xλn1 . Thus, for n large enough, we can assume v2 − xλn2 ≥ c2(x
λn
2 ,x
λn
1 )
λn
. In particular, the sequence
c2(x
λn
2 ,x
λn
1 )
λn
is bounded. Since player 1 is infinitely more prudent than player 2 at x, we get
lim
n→+∞
c1(x
λn
2 , x
λn
1 )
λn
= 0.
Recalling that xλn1 is a best reply to x
λn
2 for player 1, we get
0 = uλn1 (0, x
λn
2 ) ≤ uλn1 (xλn) ≤ u1(xλn1 , xλn1 − εn) +
c1(x
λn
1 − εn, xλn2 )
λn
= v1 − xλn1 +
c1(x
λn
1 − εn, xλn2 )
λn
, (11)
the last inequality being a consequence of the definition of uλn1 (x
λn). Here, εn > 0 can be chosen small enough (for
n large enough), such that | c1(x
λn
1 −εn,x
λn
2 )
λn
− c1(x
λn
1 ,x
λn
2 )
λn
|≤ 1
n
, which guarantees limn→+∞
c1(x
λn
1 −εn,x
λn
2 )
λn
= 0.
Passing to the limit in Equation 11, we get 0 ≤ v1 − x, a contradiction. 
6.7 Proof of Proposition 32
(1) can be found in Dastidar [9].
(2) Let
v(p1, p2) =

vN (p1) if p1 = p2,
v1(p1) if p1 < p2,
0 otherwise
and X = [pˇN , p
max]. By definition, the game G = (X, v) is symmetric, since pii(pi, p2, ..., p2) = v(pi, p2) for
every (pi, p2) ∈ X2. To prove that G is symmetrically p-robust, we can prove that it is symmetrically piecewise
continuous (see the characterizaton after Definition 17). Let us define the following partition of X2: X1 =
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{(p, p′) ∈ X2 : p > p′}, X2 = {(p, p′) ∈ X2 : p < p′} and X3 = {(p, p′) ∈ X2 : p = p′}. For each k ∈ {1, 2, 3},
the multivalued mapping p → {p′ ∈ X : (p, p′) ∈ Xk} from X to X is clearly lower semicontinuous, and the
restrictions of v to each Xk are continuous, because vN and v1 are continuous. In addition, he game is strongly
diagonally quasiconcave when the strategies are restricted to [pˇN , p
max] by assumption.
To prove that G is diagonally better-reply secure, let (p∗, v∗) in {(p, v(p, p)) : p ∈ X}), where (p∗, ..., p∗) is not
a Nash equilibrium (thus p∗ > pˆN ). Since vN is continuous, v∗ = vN (p∗). But then, any p∗ − ε for ε > 0 small
enough, secures strictly a payoff above v∗, because from the assumptions of the model, v(p∗−ε, p∗) = v1(p∗−ε) >
vN (p
∗) = v∗ for ε > 0 small enough (indeed, by assumption, for every p > pˆN , we have v1(p) > vN (p)), and from
the continuity of v1, this inequality is robust to a small modification of the other players’ strategies.
Now, applying Theorem 20, for every c ∈ F , there exists a symmetric prudent equilibrium (p, ...p), which is
also a symmetric Nash equilibrium (which implies p ∈ [pˇN , pˆN ]).
(3) We want to prove uniqueness, and more precisely that for every c ∈ F , if (p, ...p) is a symmetric prudent
equilibrium, then p = p¯. Assume first that p > p¯. By definition, there exists a sequence of positive reals (λn)n∈N
converging to 0, and a sequence of symmetric equilibria (pλn , ..., pλn) of Gλnsym, which converges to (p, ..., p). Thus
∀d ∈ X, vλn(d, pλn) ≤ vλn(pλn , pλn) (12)
Recall that by definition,
vλn(pλn , pλn) = inf
p′∈X
{
v(pλn , p′) +
c(p′, pλn)
λn
}
.
For every p′ < pλn , v(pλn , p′) = 0. Thus, taking p′ → (pλn)−, we get, from the continuity of c and from equation
12:
∀d ∈ X, vλn(d, pλn) ≤ vλn(pλn , pλn) ≤ 0. (13)
Now, we claim that there exists n large enough and ε > 0 such that pλn − ε > p¯, and such that for every
p′ ≤ pλn−ε, we have c(pλn ,p′)
λn
> vλn(pλn−ε, pλn)+1. This is possible because otherwise, up to a subsequence, we
would be able to build a sequence p′n ≤ pλn−ε such that c(p
λn ,p′n)
λn
≤ vλn(pλn−ε, pλn)+1. But vλn(pλn−ε, pλn)+1
is bounded, and
c(pλn ,p′n)
λn
tends to +∞, a contradiction.
By definition,
vλn(pλn − εn, pλn) = inf
p′∈X
{
v(pλn − εn, p′) + c(p
′, pλn)
λn
}
Recall that from our choice above, if p′ ≤ pλn − ε then v(pλn − εn, p′) + c(p
′,pλn )
λn
> vλn(pλn − ε, pλn) + 1,
thus in particular
vλn(pλn − εn, pλn) = inf
p′>pλn−ε
{
v1(p
λn − ε) + c(p
λn , p′)
λn
}
and finally, since c is a distance, this minimum is reached for p′ = pλn , that is
vλn(pλn − εn, pλn) = v1(pλn − ε).
But from pλn − ε > p¯ we get v1(pλn − ε) > 0 (because v1(p) > 0 when p > p¯). This contradicts Equation 13,
since this equation implies, for d = pλn − ε, that v1(pλn − ε) = vλn(pλn − εn, pλn) ≤ 0.
Now, assume p < p¯. By definition, there exists a sequence of symmetric equilibria (pλn , ..., pλn) of Gλnsym,
which converges to (p, ..., p) and which satisfies Equation 12. Taking d = pmax in this Equation, we get
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vλn(pmax, pλn) = 0 ≤ vλn(pλn , pλn). (14)
But by definition
vλn(pλn , pλn) = inf
p′∈X
{
v(pλn , p′) +
c(p′, pλn)
λn
}
.
Taking p′ → (pλn)+, we get in particular
vλn(pλn , pλn) ≤ v1(pλn) < 0 (15)
for n large enough (because v1(p) < 0 when p < p¯). This contradicts Equation 14.
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